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1. Introduction 
After Japan’s Fukushima disaster, nuclear energy safety is re-catching the world’s attention. The 
Fukushima accident that resulted in the melt-down of three reactor cores was rated by International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as Level 7 incident, the highest level on the International Nuclear 
and Radiological Event Scale (INES) [1]. After the Fukushima accident, anti-nuclear sentiment 
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has surged markedly in many countries [2-4]. The vulnerability of nuclear power plants (NPPs) 
worldwide has been called into question [5]. The desire for continual dependence on nuclear 
energy as a clean, reliable and affordable electricity source is overridden by the populist anti-
nuclear sentiment. Some countries have decided to immediately shut down nuclear reactors or 
gave up on plans for new plants [6] but others, such as Germany, has planned to close all of its 
NPPs by 2022; Some countries such as the UK, has recommitted to building new reactors to 
replace old ones. Whilst nuclear energy is expected to grow slowly in many developed countries 
[7], developing countries have been reliant on nuclear power due to energy security and 
environmental constraints, and a radical shift in nuclear policy was considered unlikely [8, 9].  
There are three reasons why the study of nuclear safety in China is a key priority. First, 
China has become the most ambitious country in the world in nuclear power development [10-12] 
(Figure 1). By 2013, Nuclear power makes up only 2% of China’s total electricity generation. 
However, the projected share of nuclear power will increase dramatically to 7% of total electricity 
generation by 2040 [13]. As of 2017, the share of nuclear is increased up to 4% of total electricity 
generation [14]. As of 2018, China has about 45 nuclear power reactors in operation, 15 under 
construction, and many more about to be constructed [14]. By 2014, three years after Fukushima, 
China was planning to build 72 reactors, amongst which 20 are in operation, 28 under construction, 
and 24 are being planned [15, 16] (Table 1, Table 2, and Figure 2). Nuclear power plans during 
this period reflect the Chinese sentiment towards the use of nuclear power. The nuclear facilities 
under construction will tremendously increase the existing nuclear capacity, giving a minimum of 
58GWe by 2020, 150GWe by 2030, and more than 200GWe by 2050 [16]. This massive and rapid 
development of NPPs in China can potentially put nuclear safety at risk. China has been highly 
dependent on design and knowledge imported from France, the US and Canada. China’s fast 
nuclear power expansion thus raises a question: Will the progress in nuclear safety and safety 
culture that China has achieved so far be counter-balanced by the rising in nuclear capacity, and 
the associated challenges of nuclear design, construction, operation and maintenance, and planning 
for decommissioning? Second, it is uncertain whether China’s current institutional arrangement 
that oversees nuclear safety regulations, guidelines, and procedures, can provide an effective safety 
mechanism for such a mega project and prevent catastrophic nuclear accidents. Third, there are 
ongoing concerns about whether China’s NPP can meet the IAEA safety standards. 
With a population of 1.3 billion, how China perceives and responds to the nuclear safety 
carries significant implications for the safety and security of its people. This paper explores three 
key questions. First, what is the Chinese government’s view of nuclear safety following the 
Fukushima crisis? Second, what are China’s actual responses to nuclear safety? Third, are these 
responses genuine or rhetoric? 
 Our analysis takes the following form. The first section will cover the statistical discourse 
analysis. The approach is applied to a large quantity of news media texts to identify viewpoints 
over nuclear safety [17, 18]. The approach serves as an alternative means to deciphering the 
government’s concern over sensitive issues in circumstances where obtaining relatively objective 
data via interviews or official documents is rather difficult. The second section investigates the 
actual safety performance and the governance of NPPs in China through safety performance and 
policy analysis. Finally, we will assess whether China’s response to nuclear safety is genuine or 
simply rhetoric, and propose areas for policy intervention and improvement.  
2. Methodology  
2.1 Statistical Discourse Analysis 
Traditionally, to understand the government’s concern about nuclear safety is to conduct a 
qualitative analysis based on interviews and government documents. Whilst these approaches are 
valuable, the task has become increasingly daunting as researchers are required to handle a huge 
quantity of available information. In contrast, statistical text analysis delivers a “systematic, 
objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” [19], and has become a useful 
methodology to complement qualitative analysis in domains such as policy studies [20] and media 
studies [21]. In China, state-run newspapers are the few key channels through which government 
viewpoints regarding certain policy issues are expressed and shared with the public [22, 23]. 
Systematic tracking of news reports over time could minimize potential bias of individual 
documents or interviewees. Such analysis would help reveal the change in concerns over nuclear 
safety before and after the Fukushima disaster.  
 Newspaper texts are used in this study for several reasons. Government documents are not 
always publicly accessible and tend to be prescriptive. Moreover, official documents generally 
take longer to draft and publish, and may not capture the dynamic socio-political changes in a 
timely manner. Newspaper reports permit the continuous tracking of evolving events (e.g. the 
Fukushima disaster) on a daily basis. Lastly, media texts in China are indicative of up-to-date 
policy foci and direction [24]. Unlike the Western countries, news in China is administered by 
various government bodies; the primary newspaper in China, China Daily, is state-run and targets 
at facilitating official information dissemination and policy implementation. More than 80% of the 
newspapers coverage represents the views of the government than otherwise [25], the voices of 
the public remain largely dormant in Chinese newspapers in most cases. 
 Three English state-run newspapers are collected for this research. Despite a difference in 
readership between these three English state-run newspapers and the Chinese counterparts, the 
English newspapers share similar functions as the Chinese counterpart, representing the viewpoint 
of the Chinese authority. It is therefore selected for the computational text mining study, as most 
readily available mining tools can produce far better and more reliable results when they work on 
the English instead of Chinese texts.  The newspaper texts used herein were published in three 
major English newspapers in China – namely, China Daily, Shanghai Daily and Shenzhen Daily, 
from 11 March, 2008 to 11 March, 2013. China Daily is the first state-run national English 
newspaper in China, which is considered the English equivalence of the People’s Daily. It is the 
most authoritative official newspaper and serves as the key mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist 
Party [26]. Shanghai Daily and Shenzhen Daily provide comprehensive news coverage at the 
regional level in China [27]. Most of the opinions covered by these three state-run English 
newspapers were quoted from the official sources [25]. The articles were retrieved from the news 
archive, Wisenews portal (URL: http://www.wisers.com/corpsite/global/en/home/index.html), 
using the query (“nuclear power” OR “nuclear energy”) AND “China”. The articles were verified 
manually to confirm their relevance. A total of 1,082 articles were collected, covering a five-year 
period. To compare the changes in attention over nuclear safety, the corpus is divided into (i) pre-
Fukushima sub-corpus and (ii) post-Fukushima sub-corpus (the distribution of the articles across 
the five years can be found in Table 3). 
 The text mining software package T-Lab version 9.1 (URL: http://www.tlab.it) was used 
to perform four analyses, based on statistical analysis of word frequency and co-occurrence (see 
[28] re. the use of T-Lab for data mining).  The advantage of using data mining for textual analysis 
is that the quantitative analysis is not based simply on word count. Though three newspapers may 
report the same event, for example, a speech made by a politician, the importance of such event 
would not necessarily be three times more important than another speech reported only once in the 
newspaper. T-Lab detects keywords of relatively high information load and statistical significance 
based on the distribution across news articles. For example, term frequency–inverse document 
frequency (TFIDF) is a well-attested information retrieval measure to discount high frequency 
words that are of less information value. 
A. High Frequency Word List: The most frequently occurring content words are extracted from 
each sub-corpus for preliminary comparison. They provide a preliminary indication of major issues 
discussed in the sub-corpora. 
B. Specificity Analysis: This identifies the lexical units that are typical of or exclusive to a sub-
corpus. The analysis highlights the different distribution of lexical items in the two sub-corpora. It 
shows how the discourse foci change across the two sub-corpora. 
C. Thematic Analysis: This identifies potentially important themes (topics) in the two sub-corpora. 
Key lexical items are extracted to reveal the details of themes. First, a data table is constructed to 
measure the presence or absence value of words in units such as sentences and paragraphs. Based 
on this data table with TFIDF normalization, clustering is performed on the context units. Chi-
square test is then applied to the intersections of the contingency table constructed by lexical units 
and their corresponding clusters. Last, correspondence analysis is conducted to identify the 
significant thematic clusters. Moreover, different combinations of themes can be generated for 
manual comparison to obtain the best characterization of the texts. 
D. Word Association: This reveals how co-occurrence relationships determine the local meaning 
of selected words, e.g. “nuclear safety”. One can obtain the list of words that typically co-occur 
with the selected word in the sub-corpora. The co-occurrence strength is measured by statistical 
measures of co-occurrence. 
2.2 Review of Chinese Government’s Measures on Nuclear Safety 
To identify the actual response of China towards nuclear safety, a thorough literature review has 
been conducted, covering a wide range of sources, including (1) key official documents made 
available via the website of the Chinese government, and also made available through up-to-date 
key international references and peer-reviewed journal papers; and (2) engineering data indicative 
of the safety design and operation of NPPs in China obtainable from international nuclear 
organizations and research institutes, and the nuclear power industry in China. 
 The first source is a set of key official documents from China’s National Nuclear Safety 
Administration (NNSA) covering both a technical review of China’s nuclear safety development 
and policy plans. In June 2012, NNSA released drafts of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan and the 2020 
Vision of Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention, and the Comprehensive Safety 
Inspection Report on Civilian Nuclear Facilities for public consultation. This nationwide 
inspection took nine months to complete. The inspection report concluded that the safety risks of 
NPPs in China were under control, but at the same time identified several areas that needed 
improvement in the short (by the end of 2012), medium (by the end of 2013) and long terms (by 
2015). These improvements covered technical requirements such as flood resistance, emergency 
water supplies, mobile power supplies, spent fuel pool monitoring, emergency operating facilities, 
and the monitoring of radiation and the environment [29]. 
 The policy plans concerning nuclear safety in China were covered by three major nuclear-
related policy plans approved by the State Council in October 2012: 
• The Twelfth Five-Year Plan and the 2020 Vision of Nuclear Safety and Radioactive 
Pollution Prevention (an amendment of the draft mentioned above) [30]; 
• The Nuclear Power Safety Plan (2011-20) [31]; and 
• The Nuclear Power Mid- and Long-Term Development Plan (2011-20) [32]. 
Full texts of the latter two policy plans are not publicly available. Later in the same month 
(October 2012), a white paper, namely China’s Energy Policy 2012, was published by the State 
Council. News releases and official materials presented by Chinese representatives in international 
conferences and journal papers became important supplementary information sources.  
The second source is a set of documents focusing on China’s nuclear safety performance, 
published by authoritative journals and key international nuclear organizations and China’s nuclear 
power companies. These documents contain essential and substantial data that serve as the basis 
for an evaluation and comparison of the safety design and operation of NPPs in China, including 
documents from the IAEA, and the World Nuclear Association (WNA). Figures relating to the 
size and scale of China’s latest nuclear power developments were also obtainable from the same 
source, in addition to the websites of nuclear power companies in China. 
3. Results of Statistical Discourse Analysis 
The statistical analysis is conducted to identify the concerns of the Chinese government on nuclear 
energy in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. The findings are reported below. 
A. Word Frequency 
A list of high frequency content words appearing in the two sub-corpora has been generated and 
Table 4 shows the top 20 such words. The word lists are quite similar (Table 4). However, if one 
examines the “safety”-related words more closely, it can be seen that these words underwent a 
dramatic change following the Fukushima disaster. Although the sub-corpora are comparable in 
size (175,368 vs. 153,776 character tokens), the prominence of “safety”-related words increases 
notably in the post-Fukushima sub-corpus by rank and by frequency (Table 5). 
B. Specificity Analysis 
The difference between the sub-corpora is clear from the specificity analysis, as shown in Table 6. 
Issues related to nuclear energy in the pre-Fukushima corpus are rather broad, ranging from 
international relations, and military relations, to new energy. In contrast, the post-Fukushima 
corpus comprises many terms related to crisis and safety. Generally, the degree of disproportional 
distribution of words in the post-Fukushima corpus is much higher in the Chi-square Test (Table 
6). 
C. Thematic Analysis 
Eight different thematic models (ranging from three to ten themes) are generated by T-Lab for 
each sub-corpus. The three-theme model produces the most coherent themes and is selected (the 
themes and keywords are given in Table 7 and Table 8). Figure 3 and Figure 4 also illustrate the 
relationship between the first two principal components (Factor 1 and Factor 2), which are derived 
from the contingency table via corresponding analysis and the row categories, i.e., the clusters 
(themes), or the column categories, i.e. the lemmas. Two factor scores of the theme points or the 
lemma points are shown on the X-axis and the Y-axis. Points on opposite sides of the component 
axis indicate that this component is in contrast with the corresponding categories. Smaller 
distances between the lemma points and a particular theme point suggest that the theme can be 
better characterized by these lemmas. Two themes figure equally prominently in the two sub-
corpora, namely, international cooperation / development, and capacity of and investment in 
nuclear energy-based projects. This suggests that China still considers nuclear energy to be an 
important part of its national energy strategy despite the Fukushima disaster. There are, however, 
a couple of changes in the post-Fukushima discourse. As expected, the Fukushima disaster and 
nuclear safety became the focal point in the discourse related to nuclear energy. Coverage of plant 
construction is no longer a major theme, which might reflect China’s temporary freezing of plant 
construction shortly after the disaster. Interestingly, the discourse of nuclear energy has 
increasingly been coupled with climate change and carbon emission reduction.  
D. Word Association 
The difference between the sub-corpora can be revealed by the word association of “nuclear 
power”. In the pre-Fukushima sub-corpus, “nuclear power” most often co-occurs with 
construction-related tokens. After the disaster, the phrase is associated not only with construction 
but also with accidents and safety (Table 9). 
 To summarize, the statistical discourse analysis shows that the government’s concern over 
nuclear accidents and safety surged in light of the Fukushima disaster. Despite these safety 
concerns, the development of and investment in nuclear energy has not receded and remains 
prominent. A new development is that the newspaper discourse in China has connected nuclear 
energy more strongly with climate change. Nuclear energy is framed as a clean strategy to combat 
climate change. This can be considered as a way of justifying the continual development of nuclear 
projects. 
4. Nuclear Safety Performance and Governance in China 
4.1 Nuclear Safety Performance 
4.1.1 Nuclear Power Plant Design 
The design of NPPs is an important indicator of nuclear safety.  Nuclear reactor design is classified 
by “generation”, i.e. Gen I, II, II+ and III. Safety is a key consideration in nuclear model 
classification system, apart from nuclear reactors’ cost-effectiveness, security and nonproliferation, 
grid appropriateness, commercialization roadmap and the fuel cycle. Building passive safety 
features is particularly important because they serve the safety net in case human errors have 
occurred, or auxiliary power is lost [33]. 
Gen I reactor refers to the early prototypes, research reactors, and non-commercial power 
producing reactors. Gen II reactor refers to the full-size commercial nuclear power reactors which 
began to operate during the period 1970 to 1996. The majority of the more than 350 NPPs in 
operation in the world are of Gen II. They reflect the ‘state of the art’, after the Three Mile Island 
(TMI) accident in the US, which had major implications for the safety of the predominant Light 
Water Reactor designs. China imported the established Gen II design from France and deployed 
the system at Daya Bay. The Gen II design forms the basis of many of the reactor systems currently 
being built in China. Gen II reactors carry limited passive safety design features and utilize mostly 
traditional active safety features involving electrical or mechanical operations. While these 
traditional active safety features could be initiated automatically, they may also be initiated by the 
operators [14]. 
Gen II+ is a category specific to China. It updates the M3 design (a Gen II design) built at Daya 
Bay in the 1990s [34]. The addition of safety features raises its safety level to that of at least Gen 
III. The first of these was the CPR-1000 design with improved seismic resistance, an improved 
reactor vessel for longer life, a digital control system, and built-in safety protection and mitigation 
systems. These have been enhanced in upgrades of CPR-1000 [35]. The more recent APR-1000, 
ACP-1000 and ACC-1000 aimed at being a wholly Chinese design with safety characteristics 
equivalent to the best in the world [16]. Based on the latest safety regulatory standards, the safety 
design of existing CPR-1000 and ACP-1000 models has been improved substantially, adopting 
the defense-in-death safety principle, including: defense against extreme external events 
(earthquake and floods), improvement in safety functions (cooling and power supply), prevention 
and mitigation of severe accidents, environment monitoring and emergency response, and 
emergency cooling of spent fuel pool [36, 37]. 
Gen III reactors were designed in the 1980s and offered evolutionary improvements over 
earlier reactors. Generally, they have extensive engineered safety systems against loss of coolant 
accidents, improved digital control systems and ergonomically designed control rooms. These 
types of reactors have been operating from 1995 to date [33].  
Gen III+ reactors were designed in the late 1990s to deal with residual low frequency but 
potentially high consequence risks such as external hazards, and to address whole core accidents. 
EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) and AP1000 belong to this category and are considered to be 
the state of the art in terms of safety. They have been purchased by China and are being built at 
Taishan (EPR) and Sanmen (AP1000) [16]. Recently constructed Gen III+ reactors in the West 
are generally considered to be safer than Gen II reactors due to their defense-in-depth safety design 
[38-40].  
Chinese reactors are arguably up to date technologically because they were built mostly 
after 1990 (with current design technology) whereas reactors in the rest of the world were almost 
all built prior to 1990, utilizing Gen II technology [33, 41, 42]. Currently, nine Gen II+ and two 
Gen III reactors are in operation in China, and nine Gen II+ and seven Gen III (five Gen III, two 
Gen III+) reactors are under construction (Table 1, Table 2).  
China’s commercial NPPs are subject to inspections by the World Association of Nuclear 
Operators (WANO) and are also under the IAEA’s inspections. Adopting international safety 
performance indicators, WANO inspections benchmark the safety performance of Chinese 
operators with international NPP operators [43, 44]. 
The State Council Research Office has reported a 100-fold reduction in predicted core 
damage and major release frequencies for Gen III+ designs as compared with their Gen II 
counterparts [40]. However, even the latest Gen III+ designs are not without their problems. The 
design of the digital control system of the EPR was criticized first by the UK safety regulator and 
was subsequently modified both in France and Finland. The Taishan NPP, which is currently under 
construction, is of an EPR design. This reactor has also been considered to fall short of 
international safety standards, requiring further modification [45]. 
4.1.2 Compliance with IAEA Standards 
The IAEA is a collaborative organization and has set up a series of nuclear safety standards, 
including general and specific safety requirements [46] in order to share best practice for the use 
of nuclear power. The integrated safety requirements ensure the protection of people and the 
environment, both now and in the future. According to the “Safety Assessment for Facilities and 
Activities” [46], seven features have been assessed, namely, site characteristics, safety functions, 
possible radiation risks, radiation protection, engineering aspects, human factors, and long term 
safety [47]. The IAEA safety assessment helps identify areas for improvement for management 
systems and emergency response. Table 10 summarizes the areas for improvement of the operating 
NPPs in China, based on IAEA standards. Two particular major site characteristics of the nuclear 
plants, namely, anti-flood and anti-earthquake design, and emergency response, are the areas 
where the operating NPPs should be improved [47].  
First, the site characteristics of the NPPs require improvement. The Ningde and Hongyanhe 
sites have a higher probability of earthquake as they are closer to the Circum-Pacific seismic belt, 
and so their anti-seismic capacity must be improved. Located in the coastal area of Guangdong, 
Daya Bay and Ling Ao are currently under in-depth assessment on the earthquake risk. Also, 
evaluations of the impact of secondary incidents such as tsunami resulting from an earthquake are 
being conducted on other sites. The anti-flood design of Qinshan might not be able to overcome 
extreme storm surge superimposed with the largest astronomical tide [47] (App II, p. 6).  
 Second, nuclear safety is highly dependent on safety management, especially emergency 
response planning. Most NPPs in operation have some limitations in emergency response. 
Emergency response refers to the preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological 
emergency in any state. Its implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, 
property and the environment in any nuclear or radiological emergency [46]. Daya Bay and 
Tianwan has no sound response plan in place for a situation where multiple reactors enter a state 
of emergency simultaneously. The current response plan of Tianwan and Ling Ao is not complete 
and covers only some of all the potential severe accidents. The emergency response control centers 
of Qinshan phase II, Ningde and Hongyanhe are not completed yet. There are no severe accident 
management guidelines for Qinshan phase I, and optimization of resource allocation is needed to 
better meet the requirements of an emergency response [47]. 
 Apart from the above, it has been reported that some common specific engineering and 
management issues require attention and improvement [48, 49]. These include: insufficient 
portable power supplies, movable pumps and corresponding interfaces to maintain safety-related 
functions in the event of station blackout; a lack of robust guidelines for severe accident 
management, tackling survivability and availability; inadequate preparation for integrated, 
coordinated, emergency response at multi-unit sites; weak monitoring and control of hydrogen 
explosion; weak nuclear safety-related legislation and policies for all nuclear activities, such as 
radioactive waste management; and inflexible regulatory bodies with limited financial and human 
resources. 
4.1.3 Safety Performance 
Statistics shows that China has a strong track record in nuclear safety in terms of both incidents 
[50] (Table 11) and the predicted core damage and release of its self-constructed nuclear reactors 
[51-62] (Table 12). All nuclear events that have occurred in China have been either Level 0 or 1 
(low-level) incidents. Table 11 highlights the level of each nuclear incident that has occurred in 
China based on the INES, defined by the IAEA [63]. Levels 0 to 7 indicate the severity of nuclear 
accidents, ranging from anomalies to major accidents. Levels 1-3 are classified as “incidents” and 
Levels 4-7 as “accidents”. Events without safety significance are taken as “Level 0” or “below 
scale” [64]. Events below Level 1 are generally taken less seriously; however, in some cases, they 
may set up a chain reaction, leading to more serious events. China has so far been free of severe 
nuclear accidents and enjoys a good safety record [52]. 
Two key indicators have been developed as part of the safety clearance of reactor design, 
namely, Frequency of Core Damage (CDF) and Frequency of Large Release (LRF). These 
estimates of nuclear risk are used to benchmark the safety performance of NPPs [56]. The strictest 
safety levels set by NNSA (2006) are less than 1× 10−4 per reactor year for CDF and less than 
1 × 10−5 per reactor year for LRF regarding existing reactors, and are less than 1× 10−5 per 
reactor year for CDF and less than 1 × 10−6 per reactor year for LRF regarding new reactors [51]. 
The frequency table (Table 12) shows that all operating reactors in China have attained LRF and 
CDF values well below the strictest limits set by NNSA. 
4.1.4 Speed and Scale of Nuclear Project Development  
China reveals its ambitious plans to develop the largest nuclear generators in the world, with plans 
to increase its nuclear capacity to 58GWe by 2020, 150GWe by 2030, and >200GWe by 2050 [16]. 
This rate is comparable to the peak years of the French nuclear development, when 54 reactors 
were built in 14 years, and the US nuclear construction programmes introduced in the 1980s [65]. 
China has been developing its own designs and importing designs from overseas: M310 and EPR 
from France, VVER-1000 from Russia, CANDU-6 from Canada and AP1000 from the US. 
Although China has chosen the best designs in the world, each requires specialist knowledge and 
facilities to maintain. The cost of investment and the scale of manpower required for both locally 
and overseas-designed models is onerous and high [16]. China has been working on a broad range 
of nuclear technologies to make herself independent of external supply and to become a leader in 
nuclear technology. New technologies are being explored in areas such as reprocessing and nuclear 
waste disposal, high temperature gas reactors and molten salt reactors using thorium [16]. 
4.2 Nuclear Safety Governance 
4.2.1 Governance Structure 
The decision-making process for nuclear development and safety regulation involves multiple 
authorities across various organizations. The responsibilities of these authorities sometimes 
overlap, making their roles and interaction in the decision-making process difficult to understand 
and challenging for public monitoring. Moreover, the regulation of nuclear safety lacks the 
independent verification of safety assessments and the equipment for on-site monitoring is 
insufficient.  
 Prior to 2008, authority over the energy sector in China was distributed between more than 
ten government bodies [66]. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the 
most important policymaking and regulatory authority in the energy sector. The NDRC is a 
macroeconomic management agency under China’s State Council, the highest executive 
organization in the country. The National Energy Commission (NEC) and the National Energy 
Administration (NEA) were established in 2008 as part of a major reshuffling of Chinese 
bureaucracy. The NEC is an advisory and coordination body on energy policy, working directly 
under the State Council. The NEA replaced the former Energy Bureau under the NDRC and 
absorbed various official energy bodies at the same time. As the executive arm of the NEC, the 
NEA implements energy development plans and industrial policies, promotes institutional reform 
in the energy sector, and oversees the licensing of projects, among other duties [67-69]. The State 
Council approved the restructuring plan of the NEA in June, 2013 (the current structure of energy 
bureaucracy is illustrated in Figure 5 [68-72]). A new nuclear energy department was formed, 
which was seen as an indication of the enhanced role of nuclear power in China’s future energy 
development plan.  
Under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the China Atomic Energy 
Agency (CAEA) is responsible for planning and managing the use of nuclear technologies, as well 
as promoting international cooperation [69, 72]. Following the Fukushima crisis, the NNSA is now 
authorized to develop regulations and guidelines for nuclear safety, and the licensing and 
regulating of nuclear facilities and materials, and to draft emergency response plans. It is 
administered under the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) but reports to the State Council 
directly [73] (Figure 5). 
Although the NNSA reports to the State Council directly, in practice such a hierarchical 
system leaves implementation of the nuclear safety agenda ambiguous. An issue identified by the 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) team is the implementation of legal responsibility 
for radiation protection regarding occupational radiation workers [74]. The Chinese Basic Safety 
Standards are adopted as the mandatory standards by the “General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine” but are implemented by various governmental agencies 
and industries. No authority has been delegated the administrative/regulatory responsibility to 
enforce the requirements. In general, the rapid development of the nuclear power program in China 
has raised concerns for the need to strengthen the relevant regulatory framework in general. To 
address the fragmented administration and jurisdiction, the IRRS team highlighted that the 
regulatory system should be consolidated and NNSA should be appointed as the ultimate regulator. 
4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Plans and Regulations 
The Nuclear Power Mid- and Long-Term Development Plan (2005-2020) released in November 
2007 have laid down the key principles that nuclear power is a strategic energy source and should 
be actively pursued to meet the country’s growing demand for energy sources [32, 75]. Shortly 
after the Fukushima crisis, the State Council announced that it would suspend approvals for the 
new NPPs and would perform comprehensive safety checks on both operating and under-
construction NPPs in March 2011 [76]. Following this, a nine-month comprehensive safety review 
on nuclear power was undertaken by the Chinese government [77]. Safety inspections were 
conducted regularly on all nuclear projects. To ensure nuclear safety, the Chinese government has 
invited the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) under IAEA, the WANO and the China 
Nuclear Energy Association (CNEA) (with the Research Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, 
RINPO) to conduct regular external safety reviews for NPPs, typically on a yearly basis. China 
requested and hosted 12 OSART missions in October 2011 [16]. In May 2012, a new safety plan 
for nuclear power, the 12th Five-Year Nuclear Safety Plan and the 2020 Vision, was approved in 
principle [30]. The State Council reiterated that the country would put safety and quality first in 
nuclear power development [31]. In parallel, in an unprecedented move to improve the 
transparency of nuclear regulation, the government published the Comprehensive Safety 
Inspection Report about National Civilian Nuclear Facilities, and called for public opinion on the 
new nuclear safety plan [47]. The State Council also approved two new nuclear safety plans in 
October 2012, namely, the Nuclear Power Safety Plan (2011-2020) and the Nuclear Power Mid- 
and Long-Term Development Plan (2011-2020) [78]. China would commit RMB 80 billion (USD 
13 billion) in three years’ time to improve nuclear safety at 41 reactors (both in operation and 
under construction). However, the new nuclear safety plans, which are the key official documents 
that provide the blueprint for China’s future nuclear safety development, are not available to the 
public, calling into question the government’s commitment to improve information transparency 
and public participation. List of plans and regulations on nuclear safety in China are highlighted 
with its main contents listed in Table 13. 
4.2.3 Nuclear Safety Management 
Safety management professionals are urgently needed, both to meet the growing demands for 
nuclear safety operation and regulation, and to support China’s aggressive nuclear expansion [9]. 
International and national review of China’s nuclear safety have highlighted the need to enhance 
the management of nuclear safety, by instilling a good safety culture and enlarging the professional 
workforce (Section 4.2.1). The IAEA defines a strong safety culture as “the assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals, … whereas protection and safety 
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”. The framework of safety culture 
consists of five components [79]: 
1. Safety is a clearly recognized value; 
2. Accountability for safety is clear; 
3. Safety is learning-driven; 
4. Leadership for safety is clear; and  
5. Safety is integrated into all activities. 
Building the required safety culture is a critical challenge for China. Although inspectors visit 
NPPs regularly to ensure that plant operations comply with guidelines and regulations, not all plant 
staff understand the significance of such precautions and safety has not established its position as 
a clearly recognized value among the staff of nuclear power plants [69]. MEP (NNSA) has also 
recognized “the competency gaps in performing independent audit calculations as a part of safety 
assessment”.  
The lack of skilled nuclear engineers is presenting a challenge to the safety culture in NPPs. 
Although a number of employees in the nuclear corporations is sent to other countries for training 
or is trained in China by international experts, for example, some have received trainings offered 
by the Daya Bay [28], this can hardly compensate the lack of skilled engineers properly trained 
through tertiary education. By 2020, China would require more than 10,000 graduates majored in 
nuclear engineering and science degrees, but enrolments in nuclear or related disciplines in 
universities has declined since the 1990s [80]. Increasing investments and collaborations in joint 
training programs with universities have been made by the major nuclear corporations in China in 
response to the need for specialized workforce in future [69, 80]. The manpower shortages have 
not only affected the inspections of plant constructions and daily operations, but also nuclear safety 
regulation [74]. The IRRS [74] has suggested that sufficient financial and human resources are to 
be channeled to the NPPs to maintain the regulatory infrastructure, and recommended that 
specialized management programmes be set up to train the management experts with technical 
competence. The NNSA of China plans to expand its workforce from 300 to 1,200, according to 
the government documents [81]. In the UK, professionals working in regulatory agencies have to 
possess relevant qualification plus ten years’ experience of nuclear safety in the industry. The US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), NNSA’s US counterpart, had around 4,000 
permanent staff in 2012 [82]. With a net installed capacity of nuclear energy of 100 GW [83], the 
ratio of regulatory staff to installed capacity was approximately 40 staff/GWe in the US. If China 
reaches 58 GWe installed capacity by 2020, the number of regulatory staff/GWe will be 21, 
approximately half of the US level. To meet the increasing nuclear capacity, NNSA would have 
to almost double its workforce to meet the US staffing level. The regulator’s hiring of safety 
inspectors in China is difficult because of the requirement for many years of nuclear experience to 
be competent as a regulator and the increased competition for professionals from the utility 
companies and plant operators. In many countries, the requirement is ten years’ industry 
experience post graduating from a master program. Further, it takes time for the workforce to 
acquire the technical safety expertise.  
4.2.4 Postponement of New Nuclear Projects Approval 
After a temporarily suspended construction of new NPPs aftermath the Fukushima crisis, plans to 
build reactors continue without any signs of decrease. For nuclear new builds in China, though 
GIIIs will be purchased from overseas, GII+ technologies, such as CPR1000 reactors, which are 
developed by China, will dominate the future nuclear market in China. Even though overseas GIII 
models such as EPR technologies are more popular options, GII+ models will take up the major 
share of the nuclear market in China in the near future. First, AP1000 technology transfer is 
progressing slower than expected; second, approval of AP1000s takes a long time to complete (at 
the moment, six inner-land units adopting AP1000s are yet to be approved); and, third, GII projects 
carry a much better track record than their GIII counterparts in terms of equipment supply and site 
construction [84]. Thus, future nuclear projects are unlikely to abruptly shift to GIII from GII. 
Meanwhile, the NEA has tightened up its policy and introduced a comprehensive list of safety 
measures to enhance the safety performance of GII+ technologies in China, in order to significantly 
reduce the CDF and LRF, to the internationally recognized safety level equivalent of their GIII 
counterparts [16]. The tightening in safety measures means that it will take more time than 
originally expected for new nuclear reactors to be approved in China, even though the number of 
new nuclear reactors is not expected to decrease in the near future. 
5. Discussion 
This study analyses the government’s concern over nuclear safety after Fukushima, based on an 
interdisciplinary approach. This paper dissects the issue from both social science and engineering 
perspectives, by deciphering attitudes towards nuclear safety via the state-run Chinese newspapers, 
and by researching both technical and policy documents on nuclear safety performance and 
governance in China. Our analysis ultimately answers the single most important question: Is 
China’s response to nuclear safety after Fukushima genuine or rhetoric? 
Nuclear Safety in China: Genuine or Rhetoric? 
The computational linguistic analysis shows that China’s concern over nuclear accidents and 
safety surged dramatically after the Fukushima disaster. Apart from safety concerns, the 
development of and investment in nuclear energy remains prominent. China on the whole has been 
making good efforts to improve nuclear safety performance and has maintained a reasonably good 
safety record in NPP design and operation. China has attempted to purchase or develop safer and 
more advanced Gen II+ and Gen III technologies. All nuclear incidents occurred in China have 
been Level 0-1 incidents, based on the INES scale. All operating NPPs meet the NNSA thresholds, 
and some new nuclear reactors can achieve core damage and release frequencies well below the 
NNSA threshold. Most operating reactors are required by NNSA to improve their site 
characteristics, safety management and emergency planning in some ways. 
Despite the strengths of NPP design and operation, some concerns remain. Sophisticated 
designs such as EPR Gen III+ reactors in Taishan have been modified and their safety is being 
called into question. Further, China has an ambitious plan to both grow its nuclear capacity at an 
unprecedented rate, and develop a wide range of newer nuclear technologies in parallel. China has 
attempted to enhance nuclear safety governance by institutional restructuring and by providing 
more comprehensive safety plans and regulations, including inviting the internationally renowned 
safety authority, the IAEA, to conduct external safety reviews on its own NPP facilities post-
Fukushima. However, the nuclear safety system still appears to exhibit the following deficiencies: 
1. Institutional fragmentation and overlap 
2. Eagerness to present a comprehensive and internationally recognized safety plan, but with 
inadequate transparency for public scrutiny 
3. Insufficient number of well-trained, experienced nuclear inspectors and regulators to meet 
the increasing demand in China, and difficulties in fostering a robust safety culture in the 
short term 
4. Delay in approval of new nuclear projects in the short term, but with increasing number of 
new nuclear plans in the near future 
Nuclear power is an unforgiving technology. It requires the application of high standards 
across the sectors of design, construction and operation. People and skills are crucial. How these 
people are trained, deployed and organized are also important. With the unprecedented rate and 
scale of nuclear development, the managerial challenges faced by the Chinese nuclear industry are 
huge. This poses a significant challenge, in terms of ensuring nuclear safety in China in the long 
run. It has yet to be determined how China will handle such a challenge and how nuclear safety in 
China can be ensured in a genuine sense in the future. 
5.2 Nuclear Energy and Climate Change 
The newspaper discourse in China has now more strongly connected nuclear energy development 
with climate change. The reframing of new NPP as a means of climate change mitigation in the 
news media was reported in other countries such as the UK before the Fukushima accident [85]. 
In China, nuclear energy is framed as a clean option to combat climate change. Such linkage 
reflects the Chinese government’s intention to tackle climate change via clean energy technology, 
especially nuclear power, and could serve as a means to justify the continual development of 
nuclear projects to meet the energy demand post-Fukushima. Coal is the primary energy source, 
accounting for about 66% in China’s total energy consumption in 2012 [86]. Compared with other 
energy sources, coal is a relatively low-cost option to address the growing energy demand due to 
fast socio-economic development in China. However, heavy reliance on coal has resulted in a 
number of environmental problems, such as greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and acid rain. 
As China aims to cut CO2 emissions intensity by at least 40% below 2005 level by 2020, clean 
energy alternatives, including renewable energy and nuclear energy, becomes the popular options 
[87]. According to the 12th Five-Year Energy Development Plan [88] and the Policies and Actions 
for Addressing Climate Change (2012) [89], the Chinese government emphasizes on the diverse 
development of energy and the increasing share of clean energy in the energy mix. As reported by 
IAEA, nuclear power is one of the lowest CO2 emitters among existing energy technologies and 
can improve energy security at competitive economic costs [90]. At the moment, renewable energy 
only accounts for a small portion of energy supply and presents challenges on grid integration and 
transmission over a long distance in China. As such, nuclear energy offers a more promising and 
practical solution to tackle both climate change and fast growing energy demand [9]. 
5.3 Areas for Improvement in China 
IAEA is the main organization among the international communities that have established an 
elaborate system to ensure nuclear safety around the world [80]. After the Fukushima accident, 
IAEA published an action plan to strength the global nuclear safety framework [91], focusing on 
the following areas: safety standard and assessment, emergency preparedness and response, peer 
review, international legal framework, national regulatory body and operating organization, new 
NPP development, capacity building, radiation protection, information dissemination, and 
research and development. Based on the key focus proposed in this plan, areas for the improvement 
of nuclear safety in China are listed below. 
5.3.1 Nuclear Safety Standards and Nuclear Reactor Technologies 
In China, the current Gen II+ and future nuclear reactors are mostly designed and developed at 
home [51]. Whilst it is important to encourage China to transit to Gen III technologies, it is also 
crucial for China to ensure that its own Gen II+ designs, such as CPR1000+ and Gen III+ 
CAP1000, fully comply with international safety standards. This will not only strengthen 
confidence in China’s nuclear capability but will also greatly facilitate the commercialization of 
China’s nuclear technologies [38-40]. China may also want to standardize the nuclear reactor 
technologies among different nuclear utilities. Adopting an identical design would allow an easier 
comparison of operations, identification of problems and solutions, development of common 
training programs, and establishment of industry-wide best practices.  
 Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Because of the weak safety culture among NPPs in China and the fact that there has been no severe 
accident, emergency preparedness and response management has yet to receive proper attentions. 
Some major nuclear facilities along the coastline appear not to have adequately taken into account 
the probability of earthquakes or flooding. Emergency response planning undertaken by NPPs 
such as Daya Bay is yet to address multiple nuclear accidents (Table 10, Section 4.1.1, Section 
4.1.2, Section 4.1.3). It is important for the Chinese authorities to require nuclear utilities at 
national and provincial levels to develop comprehensive nuclear safety management and 
emergency response plans, which should include the independent third-party inspection and 
monitoring of nuclear safety plans and facilities on-site and off-site. 
 Regulatory System for Nuclear Safety Management 
The institutional structure of nuclear safety management in China needs to be reviewed. In line 
with the suggestion of NNSA [73], China should set up an independent regulatory unit delegated 
with significant authority to manage nuclear safety. The IRRS [74] has suggested that sufficient 
financial and human resources should be channelled to the NPPs to maintain the regulatory 
infrastructure. The roles and responsibilities assigned to different departments in terms of nuclear 
safety management would best be differentiated. The communication of emergency response 
between nuclear safety authorities and different NPPs would be best laid out clearly. Whilst the 
national government is in charge of overall emergency planning, local governments should be 
delegated with the responsibility of leading nuclear emergency responses (e.g. coordination of the 
authorities of health and environmental protection) and providing resource support in case of 
nuclear emergency. To reduce institutional fragmentation, it is important to set up a simple but 
effective institutional structure for nuclear safety management at various levels of governance. 
Clear roles and responsibilities would be best assigned to individual units involved in nuclear 
safety management. 
As the nuclear safety culture and capacity cannot be developed overnight, a process-based 
risk-informed regulatory approach could provide the flexibility needed for China’s safety 
regulation. The Fukushima disaster has demonstrated that accidents or extreme events may still 
occur. In this case, a catastrophic flood disabled all the power and cooling systems. These types of 
accidents were previously known as Beyond the Design basis Events (BDE). In pursuing the rapid 
growth of nuclear power projects both inland and offshore, China wants to take a pro-active and 
preventive approach to ensure that serious BDE accidents are prevented and mitigated effectively. 
This process-based approach focuses on the organizational systems that the facility has developed 
to assure the ongoing safety operation from the perspective of the facility’s internal logic [92]. It 
recognizes that the design of organizational processes must remain flexible in order to allow the 
facility to create processes that are internally consistent, to adapt to their history and culture, and 
to allocate resources in the most rational way. Meanwhile, the risk-informed regulatory approach 
[59] can be adopted in parallel, to identify potential major nuclear accidents by providing an 
objective assessment of the probability of an accident together with its consequences. Subsequent 
actions can then be taken to mitigate all potential accidents. 
5.3.4 Information Transparency and Public Participation 
Transparency and public participation have been considered an absolute condition to reduce 
regulatory failure. Recently, China has attempted to increase transparency in nuclear safety 
governance by releasing new safety regulations and safety inspection reports. Radioactivity levels 
are regularly disclosed to the general public to increase transparency and for public monitoring 
[93]. Immediately following the Fukushima crisis, several regulations on nuclear communication 
were enacted, including the Program and Notice on Nuclear Safety Information Disclosure enacted 
by MEP and NNSA. Furthermore, nuclear safety information was disseminated throughout China 
by environmental protection agencies to reduce public fears. Such moves are encouraging and will 
undoubtedly strengthen the public perception of nuclear safety of the NPPs, and boost public 
confidence and effectiveness in nuclear safety management [1]. Regrettably, the disclosure of 
information by the government does not seem to reduce public fear, although the government 
remains the most trusted information provider [94]. Public participation in and access to 
information on nuclear constructions and assessments remain marginal in China [94]. Important 
information, such as the national nuclear safety plan, has yet to be released to the public. To reduce 
public fears over major nuclear incidents in China, it is suggested that the Chinese government 
should continue building trust in its nuclear safety governance. Whilst the Chinese government’s 
ongoing attempts to disclose the technical details of the safety report and radioactivity to the public 
could boost public trust, such trust would be better developed if the government would also 
carefully reconsider its manner of communicating nuclear safety information to the public. For 
instance, presenting safety information in layman’s terms so as to be understandable by the public 
could positively contribute to effective nuclear safety governance in the long run. 
5.3.5 Capacity Building on Safety Personnel and Safety Culture 
China has been making efforts to boost the workforce in nuclear industry to meet the increasing 
demand for nuclear safety inspection and regulation, and to develop a nuclear safety culture 
(Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.3). Administrative flexibility should be given to attract and retain 
suitably qualified and experienced regulatory staff. Regular rotation of resident inspectors is 
recommended to avoid regulatory capture. Also, in the absence of a well-developed safety culture, 
it is doubtful whether China would be able to introduce sweeping reform in nuclear safety 
management and ensure that the large number of new nuclear plants is safe. With more 
sophisticated nuclear reactor technologies, and increased market demand, it is rather unlikely that 
there will be enough qualified nuclear local safety personnel to oversee safety design, construction, 
operation, maintenance and decommissioning in the short run. It is suggested that China may fill 
the gap of manpower shortage by recruiting qualified safety personnel from overseas and inviting 
overseas nuclear safety experts to provide safety training to local nuclear engineers. The IRRS 
report also noted that the initial training program for university graduates is not sufficiently 
comprehensive. The IRRS team suggested introducing a mentoring program beyond the initial 
certification program to help build inspectors’ knowledge and skills, especially in areas that are 
not covered by procedures. This kind of proactive (as opposed to reactive) attitude is to be 
cultivated in order to maintain and improve safety systems. 
5.3.6 International Collaboration 
The nuclear reactors designed by China have incorporated overseas nuclear technology design. 
China’s Gen II+ technologies are based upon French M3 technologies, and China’s Gen III+ 
utilizes AP1000, from overseas. China may wish to continue working with overseas nuclear 
experts to conduct regular safety reviews and seek expert advice. Foreign experts can be invited 
to assess the design and performance of Chinese nuclear facilities that have integrated overseas 
technologies.  
In real life, cultural difference between the Chinese and the Western world may shape the 
safety culture of individual civilizations. There is a huge difference in staff-supervisor interaction 
between the East and the West. Chinese staff tends to use indirect methods to express their views 
in face of adverse events [95]. Such cultural difference may shape the safety culture in the Chinese 
nuclear industry. In the UK, understanding the importance of employee vigilance and reporting is 
required for nuclear professionals of the Nuclear Institute [96]. However, in China, it is possible 
that such indirect culture of reporting by Chinese staff and concerns about how whether one would 
get blamed if one reports an adverse event directly to his/her supervisor, would impact the nuclear 
safety culture in China. As safety culture cannot be developed overnight, China may wish to 
continuously collaborate with overseas countries and nuclear institutions in terms of nuclear safety 
training, and to start cultivating a safety culture that welcomes transparency and direct reporting 
of any problematic cases immediately, in an effort to strengthen its internal nuclear safety 
management capacity over the long-run. 
6. Conclusion 
Our research raises the important question of whether China’s response to nuclear safety following 
the Fukushima crisis is genuine or rhetoric. Our statistical discourse analysis demonstrates that 
nuclear accidents and safety have become the two high frequency words dominating the news 
corpora of nuclear power in China post-Fukushima. As the news media in China is a crucial 
channel for policy direction and promotion, our findings reflect the Chinese government’s 
significant concern over nuclear safety. These concerns have also been translated into policy 
measures, e.g. re-examination of new NPP projects shortly after Fukushima. Regarding nuclear 
safety performance, China has paid serious attention to reactor technology safety design and 
operation. Safer and more advanced Gen II+/Gen III/Gen III+ technologies are introduced and 
developed in China.  
Undeniably, China’s priority on nuclear safety is beyond rhetoric and has been moving 
progressively towards genuine. However, various concerns remain. China’s safety policy and 
governance is continuously impeded by its institutional fragmentation and overlap, unclear roles 
and responsibilities for individual departments, inadequate public transparency, lack of sufficient 
experienced safety professionals, weak safety culture, and an ambitious plan for a three-fold 
increase in nuclear capacity by 2020, and more beyond. To ensure that nuclear safety continues to 
be a key priority in the long term, nuclear safety performance in China may require specific 
institutional reform, cultural and policy change. We suggest that China should standardize design 
and safety standards, strengthen nuclear safety management and emergency response by means of 
independent third-party inspection, reform regulatory structure to reduce institutional 
fragmentation, adopt a preventative approach towards nuclear safety regulation, improve 
information transparency and public participation, and strengthen the safety culture and 
international collaboration for capacity-building. 
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Figure 1. Number of nuclear reactors in operation and under construction by country (as of 
2014) 
Source: [10-12] 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Nuclear power stations and generation type in China (as of 2014) 
Source: [15, 16] 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Themes generated for the pre-Fukushima sub-corpus 
Source: Statistics generated by T-Lab, a computational tool 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Themes generated for the post-Fukushima sub-corpus 
Source: Statistics generated by T-Lab, a computational tool 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Key bodies involved in nuclear safety regulation in China 
Source: [68-72] 
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Table 1. Status of nuclear reactors in China (as of 2014) 
Source: [15, 16] 
Location Plant Status Generation Type Reactor Type Units 
Fujian 
 
Fu Qing Under Construction II CNP-1000 4 
Fu Qing Planned III ACP-1000 2 
Ning De In Operation II+ CPR-1000 2 
Ning De Under Construction II+ CPR-1000 2 
Guangdong 
 
Daya Bay In Operation II M310 2 
Lingao In Operation II+ CPR-1000 4 
Tai Shan Under Construction III+ EPR 2 
Yang Jiang In Operation II+ CPR-1000 1 
Yang Jiang Under Construction II+ CPR-1000 5 
Guangxi 
 
Fang Cheng Gang Under Construction II CPR-1000 2 
Fang Cheng Gang Planned II CPR-1000 4 
Hainan 
 
Chang Jiang Under Construction II CNP-600 2 
Chang Jiang Planned II CNP-600 2 
Hu Bei Xian Ning Planned III+ AP1000 4 
Hu Nan Tao Hua Jiang Planned III M310 4 
Jiang Su 
 
Tian Wan In Operation II AES-91 2 
Tian Wan Under Construction II AES-91 2 
Jiang Xi 
 
Fang Jia Shan Under Construction II CPR-1000 2 
Peng Ze Planned III+ AP1000 4 
Liaoning 
 
Hong Yan He In Operation II+ CPR-1000 2 
Hong Yan He Under Construction II+ CPR-1000 2 
Shandong 
 
Hai Yang Under Construction III+ AP1000 2 
Hai Yang Planned III+ EPR 4 
Shi Dao Wan Under Construction III+ AP1000 1 
Zhejiang 
 
Qin Shan In Operation II CNP-300 1 
Qin Shan Phase II In Operation II CNP-600/650 4 
Qin Shan Phase III In Operation III CANDU-6 2 
San Men Under Construction III+ AP1000 2 
 
Table 2. Status of nuclear reactors by generation type in China (as of 2014) 
Source: [15, 16] 
Generation 
Type 
In Operation Under 
Construction 
Planned Total 
II 18 (9) 21 (9) 6 45 (18) 
III 2 7 [2] 18 [4] 27 [6] 
Total 20  28 24  72  
Note: The number in () represents the number of reactors adopting GII+ technologies and the 
number in [] represents the number of reactors adopting GIII+ technologies.  
 
Table 3. Period covered and size 
Sub-corpus Period No. of 
Files 
No. of 
Words 
Pre-Fukushima 
Year 1 (Mar 12, 2008-Mar 11, 2009) 155 
175,368 Year 2 (Mar 12, 2009-Mar 11, 2010) 225 
Year 3 (Mar 12, 2010-Mar 11, 2011) 226 
Post-Fukushima 
Year 4 (Mar 12, 2011-Mar 11, 2012) 331 
153,776 
Year 5 (Mar 12, 2012-Mar 11, 2013) 145 
 Total = 1,082 329,144 
 
Table 4. High frequency content words 
Sub-corpora High frequency content words (in descending order of 
frequency) 
Pre-
Fukushima 
China, power, nuclear, country, world, nuclear_power, energy, 
percent, development, year, billion, Chinese, market, #capacity, 
building, countries, #technology, #national, #yuan, #state 
Post-
Fukushima 
China, nuclear, energy, #Japan, country, power, world, 
nuclear_power, development, percent, chinese, countries, year, 
market, building, #coal, billion, plant, #cooperation 
Note: # indicates that the word is particularly high in the associated sub-corpus. 
 
Table 5. Rank and frequency of “safety”-related words in the two sub-corpora 
Terms Pre-Fukushima Post-Fukushima 
 Rank Frequency Rank Frequency 
“safety” 387 78 37 381 
“nuclear safety” 853 37 118 161 
“inspection” 1801 15 699 40 
“inspections” 3952 5 931 29 
“standard” 317 92 199 110 
“standards” 409 73 188 114 
“accident” 1579 17 155 129 
“accidents” 3722 5 726 38 
 
Table 6. Top 20 sub-corpus specific words/phrases (i.e. words/phrases whose frequency is 
much higher in the specified sub-corpus than the other sub-corpus (in descending order)) 
Sub-corpus Words / phrases that are more specific in the sub-corpus 
Pre-
Fukushima 
sub-corpus 
Shenzhen, wind_power, Iran, sign, new_energy, sanction, Hu, weapon, 
company, capacity, mW, deal, disarmament, Obama, Green, President, 
mainland, India, yesterday, carbon 
Post-
Fukushima 
sub-corpus 
Japan, safety, Japanese, radiation, tsunami, earthquake, disaster, salt, 
radioactive, March, accident, Tokyo, emergency, leak, inspection, food, 
vegetable, crisis, suspend, Xinjiang 
 
Table 7. Three-theme model generated for the Pre-Fukushima sub-corpora 
Theme #A1: PLANT CONSTRUCTION (19.7% of the Pre-Fukushima corpus) 
Ten characteristic words: nuclear_power, power, energy, capacity, plant, wind, reactor, 
technology, percent, construction 
Characteristic text samples for the theme: 
1. To realize the goal, the government will invest billions of yuan in the construction of nuclear power 
stations, wind farms, solar power plants and research of renewable energy technologies, Zhang said. 
Official figures show that renewable energy accounted for 9.9 percent of total energy consumption last 
year, compared to 8.5 percent in 2008. 
2. According to the National Energy Administration, China has approved nuclear power plants with total 
capacity of 25.4 gW this year, with further capacity of 13.35 gW under construction. China now has 11 
nuclear power units under operation, with a total capacity of around 10 gW. The government plans to 
increase nuclear capacity to around 70 gW by 2020. 
Theme #A2: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (19.0% of the Pre-Fukushima 
corpus) 
Ten characteristic keywords: Iran, nuclear, change, international, cooperation, climate, 
weapon, Hu, security, issue 
Characteristic text samples for the theme: 
1. President Hu Jintao attaches importance to nuclear security and closer cooperation among developing 
nations. President Hu Jintao is attending a high-profile global safety summit in Washington DC on April 
12, when 47 leaders of countries with nuclear capability will gather to discuss nuclear safety, a crucial 
issue for international security. 
2. To achieve the target, Obama mapped out three specific and interlinked goals for the world: Nuclear 
disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and the pursuit of nuclear security. That showed the US has 
changed its unevenly balanced nuclear policy. In the past, Washington has attached more importance to 
non-proliferation and nuclear security efforts while ignoring nuclear disarmament. 
Theme #A3: CAPACITY AND INVESTMENT (11.7% of the Pre-Fukushima corpus) 
Ten keywords: yuan, million, city, Shenzhen, company, mainland, investment, market, 
bank, service 
Characteristic text samples for the theme: 
1. Hong Kong and Shanghai-listed Shanghai Electric said it planned to invest 2 billion yuan over the next 
three to five years to expand into wind and nuclear_power equipment manufacturing. It expects wind 
power equipment orders to total 10 billion yuan annually over the next three to five years and expects 
nuclear_power equipment orders to total 5 billion yuan to 6 billion yuan annually … 
2. The total annual turnover of China's environmental industry reached 700 billion yuan, among which, 62.5 
billion yuan came from environmental protection related products, 50 billion yuan from environmental 
services, 420 billion yuan from recycling of resources, and 170 billion yuan from clean production 
equipment. 
 
Table 8. Three-theme model generated for the Post-Fukushima sub-corpora 
Theme #B1: JAPANESE DISASTER (20.8% of the Post-Fukushima corpus) 
Ten characteristic words: nuclear, Japan, plant, safety, nuclear_power, reactor, Fukushima, 
radiation, earthquake, tsunami 
Characteristic text samples for the theme: 
1. Making nuclear plants safe and secure (By Yin Xiaoliang). Operators of the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear_power plant in Japan failed to implement international nuclear safety standards designed to 
mitigate damage caused by earthquakes and tsunamis, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
report said last week. 
2. Nuclear experts: No need to worry Daya Bay plant. Shenzhen’s two power plants have not been affected 
by the Japan earthquake and would not explode if faced with the same situation as the plants of 
Fukushima, nuclear experts said in an interview Monday, responding to the public concern over nuclear 
safety. 
Theme #B2: COOPERATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE (11.4% of the Post-
Fukushima corpus) 
Ten characteristic keywords: cooperation, development, climate, economic, change, 
military, promote, defense, strategic, security 
Characteristic text samples for the theme: 
1. … and make greater contributions to the cause of addressing global climate change. China will continue 
to promote international negotiations on climate change, take an active part in UN climate change 
conferences, and support the coming Durban climate change conference to achieve comprehensive and 
balanced results in implementing the Bali Road Map, and make reasonable, … 
2. Adapting to Climate Change. During the 11th Five-Year Plan period, China strengthened scientific 
research in and impact evaluation of climate change, improved relevant laws and policies, and enhanced 
the capability of key sectors to adapt to climate change, so as_to reduce the negative impact of climate 
change on economic and social development and people's lives. 
Theme #B3: CAPACITY AND INVESTMENT (12.7% of the Post-Fukushima 
corpus) 
Ten keywords: percent, billion, yuan, million, year, coal, price, company, market, increase 
Characteristic text samples for the theme: 
1. China's coal-fired power producers complain that surging coal costs and artificially low electricity prices 
have hurt their profits. Investment in the coal-fired power sector stood at 105.4 billion yuan in 2011, 
compared with 94 billion yuan in hydropower, 74 billion yuan in nuclear_power and 82.9 billion yuan in 
wind power.  
2. By 2015, carbon dioxide emission per-unit GDP would_be reduced by 17 percent and energy consumption 
per-unit GDP by 16 percent as compared with that in 2010; the proportion of consumption of non-fossil 
energy to the consumption of primary energy would_be increased to 11.4 percent; and the acreage of new 
forests would increase by 12. 
 
Table 9. Top 20 words with a strong association with “nuclear power” (i.e. words frequently 
co-occurring with “nuclear power”) (in descending order) 
 Top 20 words most strongly associated with “nuclear power” (in 
descending order) 
Pre-
Fukushima 
sub-corpus 
plant, China, Guangdong, capacity, nuclear, technology, country, power, 
energy, Daya_Bay, build, construction, plan, province, development, 
national, project, total, Qinshan, industry 
Post-
Fukushima 
sub-corpus 
plant, Fukushima, China, safety, nuclear, japan, Daiichi, energy, country, 
Guangdong, project, development, crisis, plan, leak, earthquake, approval, 
construction, accident, tsunami 
 
Table 10. Areas where operating nuclear power plants need to improve with specific notes, 
by IAEA standards 
Source: [47] 
        Nuclear Power 
Plants in 
China (with 
Reactor 
Generation 
and Type) 
IAEA     
Standards 
Criteria 
D
ay
a B
ay
 (II - M
3
1
0
) 
Q
in
sh
an
 p
h
ase I (II - C
N
P
3
0
0
) 
Q
in
sh
an
 p
h
ase II (II - C
N
P
6
0
0
) 
Q
in
sh
an
 p
h
ase III (II - C
an
d
u
6
) 
T
ian
w
an
 (II - V
V
E
R
1
0
0
0
) 
L
in
g
 A
o
 p
h
ase I (II - M
3
1
0
) 
L
in
g
A
o
 p
h
ase II (II+
 - C
P
R
1
0
0
0
) 
N
in
g
d
e (II+
 - C
P
R
1
0
0
0
) 
H
o
n
g
y
an
h
e (II+
 - C
P
R
1
0
0
0
) 
S
ite C
h
aracteristics 
Earthquake 1       2 3 
Tsunami 3     4 4   
Flood  5 5 5      
Other External 
Events 
6 6 6 6 6     
E
n
g
in
eerin
g
 
A
sp
ects 
Facilities 
       
7
 
7
 
H
u
m
an
 
F
acto
rs 
Emergency 
Response & 
Management 
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Notes: 
1.  Need to conduct in-depth evaluation on the earthquake risk of Daya Bay Nuclear 
Power Plant, and complete necessary improvements. 
2. For uncompleted emergency response control center, need to make appropriate 
planning to improve the anti-seismic capacity. 
3. Need to conduct more in-depth analysis and tsunami drills. 
4. Need to enhance the capability of anti-tsunami for each NPP in the coastal areas of 
Guangdong. 
5. Problem with the design basis of flood; need for flood protection enhancement.  
6. Need to conduct probability risk assessment of external event. 
7. For hydrogen removal facilities, program design and instrument selection has 
completed; need to conduct equipment qualification test. 
8. Need to study response plan when multiple reactors simultaneously enter a state of 
emergency. 
9. Need for emergency planning for non-specific non-severe accidents. 
10. Need to install emergency response control center. 
11. Need for more detailed safety management guidelines, emergency response planning 
and resource optimization. 
12. Need for progressive design. 
 
Table 11. No. of incidents of major operating nuclear reactors in China from 2009 to 2014 
Source: [50] 
  
Operation 
Starting 
Date 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Level 
0 
Level 
1 
Daya Bay unit 1 Feb. 1994 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Daya Bay unit 2 
May 
1994 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ling Ao unit 1 
May 
2002 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 
Ling Ao unit 2 Jan. 2003 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Ling Ao unit 3 Sep. 2010 NA NA NA NA 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Ling Ao unit 4 
Aug. 
2011 
NA NA NA NA 7 0 2 0 1 0 
Ningde unit 1 
Apr. 
2013 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10 0 9 0 
Hongyanhe unit 
1 
Jun. 2013 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 12 0 5 0 
Qinshan unit 1-5 
Dec. 
1991 
2 0 5 1 10 0 5 0 5 0 1 0 
Tianwan unit 1-2 
May 
2007 
3 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Table 12. Frequency of Large Release (LRF) and Frequency of Core Damage (CDF) for major operating nuclear reactors in China 
Source: [51-62] 
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2.13×10-
5 
< 1×10-4 
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5 
< 1×10-
5 
3.3×10-6  
1.94×10-
5 
1.53×10-
5 
1.3×10-5 1.3×10-5 
< 
1.0×10-4 
< 
1.0×10-4 
< 
1.0×10-5 
LRF 
2.45×10-
6 
< 1×10-5 < 1×10-5 
< 1×10-
6 
6.4×10-8  
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×10-6 
< 1×10-6 < 1×10-6 
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1.0×10-6 
Source [51, 54] [51] [51, 58] [52] [71] [51, 54] [51, 54] [51, 62] [51, 62] [53] [51, 60] [51, 60] 
Table 13. List of nuclear safety plans and regulations in China 
Plan/Regulation Date Issued Issuing Authority Main Contents  
Nuclear Power 
Mid- and Long-
Term Development 
Plan (2005-2020) 
November 2007 NDRC (1) Polices for market-oriented 
mechanism, innovations in 
research and development, 
legalization and regulation, 
talent training, tax/investment 
incentives, and nuclear fuel 
security/post-processing funds; 
(2) By 2020, the goal of 
installed capacity for in-
operation NPPs and under-
construction NPPs is 40GWe 
and 18GWe, respectively. 
State Council 
Executive Meeting 
March 2011 State Council (1) Suspend approvals for new 
NPPs; (2) Perform 
comprehensive safety checks 
on both existing and under-
construction NPPs; (3) 
Improve safety management 
on in-operation NPPs. 
12th Five-Year 
Nuclear Safety 
Plan and the 2020 
Vision 
May 2012 State Council (1) Improve the ability to 
prevent and mitigate serious 
nuclear accidents; (2) 
Strengthen research and 
development on nuclear 
technology and application; 
(3) Improve emergency system 
for nuclear accidents; (4) 
Enhance regulatory capacity 
by independent evaluation, 
public transparency and 
international collaboration. 
Nuclear Power 
Safety Plan (2011-
2020) 
Nuclear Power 
Mid- and Long-
Term Development 
Plan (2011-2020) 
October 2012 State Council (1) Resume NPP construction 
steadily; (2) Only arrange a 
few fully demonstrated coastal 
sites during the 12th Five-Year 
period and exclude inland 
sites; (3) Develop new NPPs 
based on the highest safety 
standards around the world. 
New NPPs must meet the 
safety requirements of Gen III 
technology. (4) By 2020, the 
goal of installed capacity for 
in-operation NPPs and under-
construction NPPs is 58GWe 
and 30GWe, respectively. 
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